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y wife is often startled when the phone rings. The phone doesn't bother the kids or me, but all of us have, at one time or another, found ourselves alone in a room only to turn and be startled by someone hovering behind us. My son Sean, like most respectable eight-year-olds, can, to his great pleasure, startle his older sister. There are rarer and stranger startles. Once, walking across a parking lot in the middle of the day, I was startled by what turned out to be a leaf. It wasn't a dangerous leaf, but, pushed by the wind, it made an uncanny scuttling sound behind me. The sound was odd enough and "out of place" enough to startle me. Garden-variety startles provide an affective punctuation to various folk entertainments such as hide-and-seek, surprise parties, spook houses. One confidante tells me that upon leaving Madame Tussaud's in London she once saw visitors who were startled by a motionless "wax figure" that suddenly moved: all a bit of fun orchestrated by the management. More typically, I once saw a horror film with a friend who was startled so frequently and forcefully that I worried he would pull a muscle. Since, at the time, I was writing a dissertation on cognition and the horror film, I did not let these and other startles pass, but considered how a leaf, or a phone, or a film can startle us, and whether the mere fact of startles and/or a theory of their function might add to or challenge current thinking about the mind and its relation to real and virtual space.
Many laymen and not a few philosophers and psychologists have been content to relegate startle to the category of dumb reflex, little more dynamic than a sneeze or a knee jerk. That film startles occur only during a particular scene type should alert us that something complicated and odd is occurring. Indeed, I believe film startles reveal the fundamental characteristics of cinema spectatorship, offering the most pointed opportunity for addressing and explaining the age-old paradox that fictions and representational spaces can stimulate intense emotional responses in spite of an awareness of fictionality.2
Millions have been startled while watching threatening film scenes. We can pinpoint the frames in Cat People (1942) where one of film's first startles-a public bus of all things-bursts into frame; we can study the exact moment in Jaws (1975) when Hooper, while scuba diving, is startled by a corpse popping through a shattered boat hull; we can inspect the infamous startle in Wait Until Dark (1967) when Alan Arkin's psychotic killer (supposedly incapacitated) leaps, Olympic-like, after Audrey Hepburn's blind housewife. My study of over 100 American horror and thriller films from the early 30s to the present reveals formal refinements and increased usage of this effect. For instance, 1942's Cat People deploys two startle effects, while Paul Schrader's 1982 remake offers eight, a typical example of the hypersensationalization of the post-Psycho horror/thriller film.
David J. Skal, echoing others, claims that the birth of cinema itself was an occasion for audience startles:
In America, more direct and visceral means were favored to hold and startle an audiencelocomotives hurtling toward the screen, for instance, or a bandit firing his gun directly into the camera's eye (both effects were employed in 1903 by Edwin S. Porter in The Great Train Robbery). Quaint though these techniques may seem today, they once had the power to make audience members faint.3
Examples such as these serve as apocryphal encapsulations of the birth of cinematic sensationalism, and, according to David Bartholomew, share something with horror:
Its origin [horror], indeed, is the origin of all moving pictures, going right back to the Lumiere brothers' 1895 exhibition of A Train Entering a Station, a short documentary sequence to which early audiences reacted with a frenzy, ducking away from the seemingly onrushing train on the screen and fleeing the auditorium in fear. Of course, the Lumieres' little film was not a horror film as we've come to know it, but it provoked fear and psychological unease in its audiences (who had not yet learned how to "look" at movies), and that is precisely how the horror film has always functioned historically.4
These familiar stories of early spectator naivete seem always to imply that more modem, media-savvy viewers can resist manipulation. No one today, after all, runs from or faints before hurtling movie trains, or flinches from camera-directed gunplay. However, viewers, even filmmakers and media critics, can still be startled by film. This effect is powerful for many reasons, not least of which is the film's overall phenomenal trajectory, which successfully engages viewers in imagining one of cinema's most dreadful offscreen threats (try to remember the alien before it was overexposed through sequels, comic books, and millions of toys). In contrast, Ripley is a sympathetic, even admirable character, and, by film's end, the sole survivor and only remaining character for viewer identification. In addition, Scott manipulates pacing at the crucial moment of the threat intrusion, contrasting near motionlessness with frenetic movement, achieved through the juxtaposition of Ripley slowly inching toward the corer in close-up and the brief shock cut of the rapidly moving alien. This shock cut is not just a narrative surprise, but a formal one, a violation of the established pace of diegetic motion, editing, and shot duration.
Alien benefited from a large budget and a good script, from Ridley Scott's experience producing slick television spots and dynamic feature films, and from a collection of crafts and effects personnel as good as any ever assembled for a science fiction or horror film. Deep Space is set not in space, but in a large American city, where character actor Charles Napier plays a tough cop out to stop a military-industrial weapon set loose on an unsuspecting populace. The weapon turns out to be a toothy, tentacle-hurling, low-budget variation of H.R. Giger's alien design. It is this daunting beast that Napier must confront in a dark and deserted warehouse. Carrying a combat shotgun, a bandoleer of shells slung across his chest, and two pistols wedged between his belt, Napier enters the warehouse alone and is quickly startled by a band of lovely white pigeons, one of which perches on his shoulder until he carefully brushes it off. It is about this time that the viewer notes how well a fog-machine can dramatize the space of an enclosed warehouse. Continuing his search in the foggy moor of the warehouse, Napier discovers, like some misplaced basketball, the head of a security guard. As he backs away from the sight, Ray contracts the frame to a medium close-up, an unmotivated red light illuminating the actor. Napier continues to back up as the monster moves forward into the background of the shot (an obvious homage to Ripley's hallway meeting with the alien on the Nostromo). Throughout, the electronic music meanders in the background with little sense of rhythm or dramatic tempo. With Napier in the foreground and the toothy one in the background, the monster gives a feeble roar and Napier an equally feeble reaction of horror: the fight is on.
Obviously Ray is sending up the genre and Alien, but Deep Space does include other scenes with vigorous startles. Since threat scenes are scene-level constructions, they can powerfully and quickly establish a predominant tone of horror or comedy independent of a narrative's overarching emotional tenor. Other experiments have shown startle amplification even without slides or video images while subjects recall and imagine negative-rated sentences, such as: "I tense as THE NURSE SLOWLY INJECTS THE SHARP NEEDLE INTO MY UPPER ARM, and beads of sweat cover my forehead." And, similarly, positiverated sentences-"I AM RELAXING on my living room couch LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW ON A SUNNY AUTUMN DAY"-lead to less powerful startle blinks than either negative or neutral sentence imagery. 21 The significance of this study should not be lost on humanists, nor rejected out-of-hand by those threatened by scientism or the wires and electrodes of experimental psychology. What is being exposed here is the power of the imagination, its capacity for visualization, and a linkage to affect that bypasses conscious reason.
In a major synthesis of theories of film spectatorship, Judith Mayne argues that much of film theory stems from two equally "extreme positions"-either a version of "apparatus" theory in which the viewer is seen as fully determined by the narrative film, or a reconsideration that sees viewers as active and resisting consumers of films. For example, Mayne contrasts Raymond Bellour and the Camera Obscura approach with Stuart Hall and cultural studies theorists like John Fiske. To Mayne, Both positions ascribe an unqualified power to the text, on the one hand, and socially defined readers/viewers on the other. The problem in each case is that the activity of making meaning is assumed to reside in one single sourceeither the cinematic apparatus, or the socially contextualized viewer. To be sure, variations are allowed in either case, but they are never significant enough to challenge the basic determinism of the model in question.22
All the significant theories of film studies rest, ultimately, on simple models of causality, where a single agent serves as the determining force, whether the artist of auteurism, the patriarchy of feminism, the art object of formalism, the basic mental operations of cognitive psychology, the capitalism of Marxist theory, or the psychological conflict between desire and control at the center of Freudianism. As writers and readers we quite easily reduce 300-page books and entire careers to a "basic determinism," an expression of causality as simple as this causes that. Even nuanced works that explore dynamic, multi-causal relationships ultimately endow one agent as the primary causal force.
Startle is highly significant in this context. On first glance it appears an outstanding example of a biologically determined, universal effect, with little to do with culture, capitalism, or media apparatus. Not surprisingly, in Post-Theory, Noel Carroll uses startle to challenge the contemporary theoretical assumption "that every level of cinematic reception is fraught with political and ideological repercussions." Carroll argues:
... it strikes me as incontrovertible that filmmakers often play upon what psychologists call the "startle response," an innate human tendency to "jump" at loud noises and to recoil at fast movements. This tendency is, as they say, impenetrable to belief; that is, our beliefs won't change the response. It is hardwired and involuntary. Awareness of this response enables theorists like me to explain the presence of certain audiovisual patterns and effects in horror films, without reference to politics and ideology. Indeed, insofar as the startle response is impenetrable to belief, it could be said to be, in certain respects, beyond politics and ideology. Moreover, such examples indicate that there is a stratum of theoretical investigation at the level of cognitive architecture that can proceed while bracketing questions of ideology.23
Similarly, David Bordwell argues that certain film effects such as startle are not utterly arbitrary and socially constructed, but are-adapting Ernst Gombrich-"sensory triggers"24 that are more indebted to nature than effects which rely on higher, socialized forms of learning.
The powerful biological determinism of startle (its hardwired status) is clear from Landis and Hunt's studies in the 1930s. Using high-speed cinematography, the two psychologists recorded New York City policemen training at the firing range: "Every subject showed an eyelid response to every shot. No matter how familiar the men were with revolver practice, no matter how well trained they were, the lid reflex was present in every case" (The Startle Pattern, 36-7). Marksmen, of course, do not want to startle while carefully aiming: "The men were not conscious of the blinking, head movement, and facial response and in a few cases emphatically denied the possibility of such a response. Convinced only by a demonstration of the film, they were quite surprised to find that they 'made faces' when the revolver was fired, despite their years of training" (The Startle Pattern, 37).
But startle is much more complex and interesting than dumb, hardwired reflexes like the sneeze and the knee-jerk. Even Landis and Hunt, who recognized and described a general startle pattern, noticed that no two startle responses were exactly alike. The nearer the onset of the original response (speaking of microseconds), the more innate, "hard-wired" the response; conversely, the further from onset, the more learning, context, and personality influenced behavior.
Ronald Simons, one of the few to write a booklength study of startle, holds that startle "is determined Eddy Zemach has recently employed this dividedmind foundation to rebut Kendall Walton's famous "pretend" theory of aesthetic response.28 Zemach argues that fear and pity derived from narratives are not "quasi" emotions, but the real thing, although mitigated by a rational reader/viewer who maintains separate mental "dossiers," one of which, a "dominant" one, asserts its rational awareness of fictionality. Although we may fear the green slimes of film, and pity the Anna Kareninas of fiction, we do not act on these emotions: "For rational adults, emotion is never a cause of action; rather, it gives one a reason to act in a certain way. Reasons are weighed against other reasons: they are defeasible, so emotion need not lead to action" (43).
Regarding the startle response: viewers can be startled by film sound and motion in part because the systems that immediately attempt to judge sound and visual motion make no distinction between real and apparent motion, or real and amplified sound.29 Films can manipulate us, in part, by actually manipulating our environments, constructing energy fields we take, before reason, to be extensions of the physical world.
Who's Afraid of Surprises
Startle has probably been neglected, to some extent, because no theory has given us the framework with which to view it as emblematic of something important about viewer psychology. In addition, startle may seem to most humanities-trained film scholars a subject of study reserved for social scientists and psychologists. But it is certainly more than a curio. As a humanities-trained film scholar, I don't recommend our field begin conducting laboratory experiments (although it would certainly be useful to consult with those developing experiments that focus on film and media). However, if we continue to neglect the recent, amazing work in the social sciences and cognitive psychology that relates to and informs our concerns with media effects, we will maintain an insular and comfortable ignorance and fail both our individual curiosities and our collective responsibility to contribute toward intellectual discovery.
Who's afraid of startles? I can playfully speculate.
Poststructuralists might not fear startle specifically, but they are decidedly troubled with the larger concepts startle necessarily implies: biology, anthropological universals, and evolutionary adaptation that cannot be, in the end, fully dissolved or transformed in Culture. New cognitive rationalists and traditionalists might fear startle because it is, to a large degree, patently deterministic, an irrational expression of the mind that cannot be, in the end, reduced to free, conscious agency. Startle slept through the Enlightenment. For non-academics (most film reviewers and other journalistic guardians of the public good), startles are the ultimate form of sensationalism, artlessness, and mindlessness. The only groups not afraid of startle appear to be film viewers and makers, whose appreciation of the effect remains strong after 50 years. Why have startle effects become a common feature of the horror and thriller film genres? The why question is more difficult and diffuse than how startles can occur in film spectators. My own conclusion, not at all original, is that startles prove to us, in the very maw of virtual death, how very much alive we are. Much like the genres they are found in, startles engage our primitive psychophysiologies, and, for an hour or so, mock and remember mortality. Perhaps, too, in revealing what we do not actively con-
